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This article attempts to ask the question of whether
copyleft free software licences constitute valid legal con-
tracts, in particular with regard to the fact that they may
create obligations through a distribution chain. There is
increasing interest in the non-proprietary licence model
expressed in popular documents such as the general
public licence (‘‘GPL’’), but not enough work has been
done in asking perhaps the most important question of
all: are these contracts enforceable? Is there really a viral
transmission of obligations? To do this the GPL licence
will be analysed to try to determine whether or not the
terms included are contractually valid.
Introduction
The issue of non-proprietary software licences—such as
the free software (‘‘FS’’) and open source software
(‘‘OSS’’) licence models—is gaining interest in legal cir-
cles, a development that must be welcomed, taking into
consideration that the phenomenon of open source/free
software licensing was initiated with almost no inter-
vention from legal scholars, leaving the legal profession
once again to play catch-up in the fast-paced computer
world.
Non-proprietary software licences pose some inter-
esting questions from a traditional contractual law per-
spective because they create what some authors have
defined as a viral contract, a contract that is to be trans-
mitted through a distribution chain. The question must
be asked whether the obligations arising from the initial
licence are to be considered enforceable, or if any of
these contractual terms should be suspect, particularly
in jurisdictions where unfair contractual terms are
strongly regulated. There have been a surprisingly small
number of court cases generated by these licences—
something that will undoubtedly change with the legal
battle started by SCO—so a full study of the eventual
validity or invalidity of the contractual copyleft clauses
must be subject to an analysis by the academic commu-
nity, something which has not been forthcoming in this
side of the Atlantic.1 The present work will attempt to
redress the trend in Europe by looking at the contrac-
tual validity of the FS licensing (in particular copyleft
licences) as opposed to the OSS model, which is less
restrictive and whose contractual clauses are much less
likely to generate judicial revision. The author is aware
that this may prove difficult because of the lack of judi-
cial review of the licences, but the main objective of the
article is to start a much needed debate in this area.
Non-proprietary Software
Free software or open source?
It has become increasingly common to read the term
‘‘open source’’ applied to all types of software developed
under a free distribution of the programme’s source
code.2 It is important to stress that it is technically
incorrect to refer to all of these models of software
development as either open source (‘‘OS’’) or free soft-
ware (‘‘FS’’), which are the two main types of non-
proprietary software, but not the only ones by far.
In general, there are some philosophical differences
between both terms. In the strictest sense, the FS con-
cept is centred on the concepts and philosophies of
developing programs and distributing them freely.3 This
is not the place to provide a detailed description of the
birth of the FS model,4 but suffice it to say that FS is
not new. It has been noted that software sharing is ‘‘as
old as computers, just as sharing of recipes is as old as
cooking’’.5 It is vital to note that the meaning of the
word ‘‘free’’ in FS does not mean free as in having no
price, but rather free as in ‘‘freedom’’.6 Stallman defines
free software as having the following four character-
istics:
u The freedom to run the program.
u The freedom to study how the program works by
giving access to the source code.
u The freedom to redistribute copies.
u The freedom to improve the program and release
those improvements to the public.7
As understood by the proponents of free software, pro-
grammers and other developers can charge for the soft-
ware if it is their desire to do so, but the same
underlying freedom behind the software must exist
either if it is acquired for a fee or if it is not. The user
1 This is not the case in the United States, where there has
been some interesting work in this area. See for example R.
Gomulkiewicz, ‘‘De-Bugging Open Source Software Licensing’’
(2002) 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75; D. Ravicher, ‘‘Facilitating Collab-
orative Software Development: The Enforceability of Mass Mar-
ket Public Software Licences’’ (2000) 5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 11,
2000; and C. Nadan, ‘‘Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue’’
(2002) 10 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 349.
2 Source code refers to the programming statements in a pro-
gramming language that exists before the program is compiled
into an executable application.
3 T. Stanco, ‘‘We are the New Guardians of the World’’, May
16, 2001, http://lwn.net/daily/guardians.php3.
4 There are several works that achieve this, see: J. Naughton, A
Brief History of the Future (1999), pp.172–174; H. E. Pearson,
‘‘Open Source: The Death of Proprietary Systems?’’ (2000) 16/3
Computer Law & Security Report 151–156; and R. Stallman,
‘‘The GNU Project’’, 1998, last updated October 24, 2001,
www.gnu.org/gnu/thegnuproject.html.
5 Stallman, ibid.
6 Or as it is often stated in OS and FS circles, free must be
understood as in freedom, not as in beer.
7 R. Stallman, ‘‘The Free Software Definition’’, 1996, last
updated October 17, 2001, www.fsf.org/philosophy/free-sw.html.
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must still be able to have all of the freedoms described,
with access to the source code as the most basic requi-
site.8 The Free Software Foundation (‘‘FSF’’) goes as
far as to state that
‘‘The freedom to use a program means the freedom for
any kind of person or organization to use it on any kind of
computer system, for any kind of overall job, and without
being required to communicate subsequently with the
developer or any other specific entity’’.9
This freedom is protected by the adoption of a restric-
tive licensing model that makes use of existing copyright
legislation that guards the source code from proprietary
software developers who want to copy it, adapt it and
include it in their own programmes. This licensing
model will be explained in more detail later.
Open source is closely related to the free software
development, but it does contain a different emphasis
with regard to the freedoms involved. The term ‘‘open
source’’ was coined during a strategy meeting in Feb-
ruary 1998 in Palo Alto, California, by a group of soft-
ware developers with links to the Linux operating
system.10 The group met to plan a new strategy in
response to the groundbreaking announcement by
Netscape that they would be opening their operations
and providing the source code of the popular Netscape
internet browser to the public, prompted by fierce com-
petition from Microsoft.11 They believed that this ges-
ture would give them a precious opportunity to sell the
Open Source development approach to the corporate
world.12
The need to create a new term to define this view-
point had become evident because, until then, the prev-
alent way to describe all output produced by the
non-proprietary approach was by using the expression
‘‘free software’’, based mostly on the FS philosophy
described. It was apparent to many software developers
that this movement had a tarnished reputation in the
business world as a result of the more radical ideas held
by people linked to the FSF.
In the widest sense, open source is the opposite of
‘‘closed source’’, the traditional proprietary approach to
software development in the commercial world. Closed
source is software ‘‘in which the customer gets a sealed
block of bits which cannot be examined, modified, or
evolved’’.13 The main idea behind Open Source is to
provide software for which the source is available for
examination, modification and peer-review. The official
definition of OSS came out of the original meeting, and
was based on the Debian Free Software Guidelines, a
licensing model that accompanies the Debian GNU/
Linux system, a Linux distribution.14 This has gen-
erated an Open Source Definition (‘‘OSD’’), which
includes a recommended set of clauses that an OSS
licence should contain.15
There are several similarities between OSS and FS
licences. In fact, some OSS licences have been deemed
to be compatible with FS principles, and vice versa.16
Nevertheless, there are several differences between the
FS and OSS philosophies. The main difference is the
fact that OSS does not impose in its licences obligations
for derivative software to be kept free—such as the case
of the copyleft licences that will be explained later—a
practice that has been deemed too restrictive and com-
mercially unfriendly by its proponents. One of the many
complaints that FS advocates make of the open source
philosophy is that it is not strong enough in trying to
keep software free, and that it simply allows anybody to
name their software ‘‘open source’’ even if it is not.17
This is a problem that has been partially acknowledged
by OSS proponents, which is why they have created the
Open Source Initiative (‘‘OSI’’) certification. This certi-
fication is given to those licences that follow the Open
Source definition and provides a certification to inform
the public that the software is indeed open source.18
There are many different OSI certified licences,19 and it
is important to point out that this list includes all sorts
of FS licences that comply with their definitions and
guidelines.
Regardless of whether one prefers the term open
source or free software, it has become important to use
a phrase that encompasses all sorts of definitions within
this development model. The author prefers the use of
the phrase ‘‘non-proprietary’’ as an umbrella term
which refers to all the different sub-categories encom-
passed by this movement, and which would ultimately
mean that the source code is made available for all sorts
of derivative purposes. Another acceptable term is
‘‘Libre Software’’—now in use by the Information Soci-
ety Directorate General of the European Commis-
sion20—as the Spanish and French word ‘‘libre’’ has a
more precise meaning than its equivalent in English,
and encompasses better the philosophy behind non-
proprietary development systems. Another valid way of
describing this is to refer to free and open source soft-
ware (‘‘FOSS’’), or even free, libre and open source
software (‘‘FLOSS’’). The distinction may seem aca-
demic, but it is important because the use of each of
8 R. Stallman, ‘‘Selling Free Software’’, 1996, last updated
August 8, 2001, www.fsf.org/philosophy/selling.html.
9 Stallman, n.7 above.
10 Open Source Initiative, ‘‘History of the OSI’’, 2001, www.
opensource.org/docs/history.html.
11 It may even be said that Microsoft’s competitive tactics
against Netscape were excessive and even predatory, and they
prompted the antitrust case brought by the US Department of
Justice against Microsoft. A roadmap to the case can be found
here: www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/ms/top.html.
12 Open Source Initiative, n.10 above.
13 E. Raymond, ‘‘Keeping an open mind’’, March 1999, http:/
/tuxedo.org/~esr/writings/openmind.html.
14 The guidelines can be found here: www.debian.org/social_
contract.html#guidelines.
15 The OSD can be found here: www.opensource.org/docs/
definition.php.
16 For examples of these, see: Free Software Foundation,
‘‘Various Licences and Comments about Them’’, 1999, last
updated June 15, 2003, www.fsf.org/licences /license-list.html.
17 R. Stallman, ‘‘Why ‘Free Software’ is better than ‘Open
Source’ ’’, 1998, last updated August 20, 2001, www.fsf.org/
philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.html.
18 Open Source Initiative. ‘‘OSI Certification Mark and Pro-
gram’’, April 30, 2001, www.opensource.org/docs/certification_
mark.html.
19 At the moment there are a total of 43 OSI certified
licences.
20 Working group on Libre Software, ‘‘Free Software / Open
Source: Information Society Opportunities for Europe?’’, April
2000, http://eu.conecta.it/paper/paper.html.
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these terms presupposes a specific development philos-
ophy behind the software. The author also believes that
the use of either FOSS or non-proprietary software is
better than to use FS or OSS separately. This is because
they encompass all different types of philosophies and
distributions, ranging from commercial variations of the
non-proprietary model to those that are offered freely to
the public.
Copyleft licensing
From the many different types of FS recognised by
most non-proprietary proponents, the most popular
type of FS distribution is by means of copyleft licensing
—with surveys estimating more than 70 per cent of
non-proprietary software uses copyleft licences as their
main contractual mechanism.21 Copyleft is free soft-
ware with a twist; it maintains the general freedoms
awarded to FS users, but by acquiring a copyleft pro-
gram, the user has to agree to a licence agreement that
states that that the software will not be used to develop
proprietary applications derived from it.22 The FSF has
a specific definition of what a proprietary program is for
the purposes of copyleft licences. According to them, a
proprietary program is one that is ‘‘software that is not
free or semi-free. Its use, redistribution or modification
is prohibited, or requires you to ask for permission, or is
restricted so much that you effectively can’t do it
freely’’.23
Copyleft was created from a perceived need to pro-
tect the fruits of non-proprietary development. After
several years of producing computer programs with a
sharing mentality and offering the code to the public,
developers realised that some software developers had
started using FS outputs in a parasitical fashion, obtain-
ing the source code, tweaking it and selling it as com-
mercial proprietary software with very low production
costs.24 Copyleft became the contractual solution to
stop companies profiting from non-proprietary prod-
ucts by distributing software that must remain free.25
For GNU software, the recommended contract to
use is the general public license (‘‘GPL’’), which is a
standard contract that ensures that the software code is
passed on, and anyone who redistributes the software
—with or without changes—must also pass along the
freedom to further copy and change it. This places a
burden on the person transferring the software; the bur-
den is that the software must remain ‘‘free’’, as defined
by the FSF and the GPL. This is different from just
placing software in the public domain because the work
maintains its copyright protection.26
The GPL is the main exponent of the legal frame-
work that sustains the copyleft system. It reads as a
mixture of a legal contract and an ideological manifesto.
The preamble to the work states clearly some of the
most common beliefs of free software and the non-
proprietary approach, with several admonitions about
the meaning of the word ‘‘free’’. The main point is that
the source code must be made available to the users.
The preamble says:
‘‘For example, if you distribute copies of such a program,
whether gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all
the rights that you have. You must make sure that they,
too, receive or can get the source code. And you must
show them these terms so they know their rights.’’27
The licence specifies that this is achieved by two means:
by protecting the software by means of copyright; and
by providing the users with a licence that gives them the
freedom to use and modify the software in any way they
see fit. The main body of the licence reiterates these
ideas. Section 1, for example, states:
‘‘1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the
Program’s source code as you receive it, in any medium,
provided that you conspicuously and appropriately pub-
lish on each copy an appropriate copyright notice and
disclaimer of warranty; keep intact all the notices that
refer to this Licence and to the absence of any warranty;
and give any other recipients of the Program a copy of
this License along with the Program.’’28
This section also mentions that the user can make mon-
etary charges when passing the copy, which is also con-
sistent with the general free software characteristic that
does not discriminate against commercial software as
long as it is not proprietary commercial software.
Many of the provisions of the GPL can be found in
other non-proprietary licences, including several OSS
ones. What makes the GPL unique is s.2(b), as this is
where the restrictions against using the software to cre-
ate commercial software are specified. The section
reads:
‘‘2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program
or any portion of it, thus forming a work based on the
Program, and copy and distribute such modifications or
work under the terms of Section 1 above, provided that
you also meet all of these conditions: . . .  b) You must
cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in
whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program
or any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge
to all third parties under the terms of this License.’’29
What this means is that any software developed by using
the open source code of the copyleft programme must
not charge for the derivative product, and most impor-
tantly, must ensure that the GPL is transferred to fur-
ther users of the derivative software. This type of licence
has been aptly named a ‘‘viral contract’’ by Professor
Radin, defining them as ‘‘contracts whose obligations
21 M. O’Sullivan, ‘‘Making Copyright Ambidextrous: An
Expose´ of Copyleft’’ (2002) 3 Journal of Information, Law and
Technology (JILT), 2002, http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/02-3/
osullivan.html.
22 R. Stallman, ‘‘What is copyleft?’’, 1996, last modified
05/11/2001 (???), www.fsf.org/copyleft/copyleft.html.
23 R. Stallman, ‘‘Categories of Free and Non-Free Software’’,
last modified December 29, 2002, www.gnu.org/philosophy/
categories.html.
24 R. Stallman. ‘‘Copyleft: Pragmatic Idealism’’, 1998, last
updated August 26, 2002, www.fsf.org/philosophy/pragmatic.
html.
25 H. Meeker, ‘‘Why you need to understand open source
licences’’ (2001) 19 International Technology Law Review
24–27.
26 P. Lambert, ‘‘Copyleft, copyright and software IPRs: is con-
tract still king?’’ [2001] E.I.P.R. 165–171.
27 Free Software Foundation, ‘‘GNU General Public
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purport to ‘run’ to successor of immediate parties’’.30
These contracts would then spread in a viral form, as
the licensee must include the terms of the GPL in any
subsequent licence they will include in their derivative
work because that obligation is part of the contract, and
then those subsequent licensees will have to impose the
same contractual terms in further licences that they
perform, ad perpetuam.
The restrictions imposed by copyleft would seem to
go against some of the principles of free software
because of the viral imposition of restrictions and obli-
gations, which denies the very freedom of doing what
one desires with the software—and the FS proponents
should face the fact that this may very well include the
freedom to commercialise and profit from the subse-
quent use of the code. The use of non-proprietary soft-
ware to create a proprietary or ‘‘closed source’’ software
may be morally suspect, but one cannot elevate freedom
to the highest pedestal and begrudge those who will use
that freedom for purposes that are philosophically and
politically adverse to those of the creator of the pro-
gram.
Another conundrum that must be understood is the
distinction between contractual enforceability and cop-
yright protection awarded to computer programs. It
could be said that copyleft licences create a double-
pronged protection of the software. On one hand they
pose contractual restrictions in the shape of a licence, in
particular by the contractual enforceability of the GPL
licence and its clauses. On the other hand, works pro-
tected by copyleft use copyright protection to be able to
make this licence enforceable. This certainly creates an
interesting relationship between the predominant
nature of copyright, which is directed towards the pro-
tection and regulation of ownership, and a system that
seems to advocate the exact opposite. The irony that
such a contrary system requires copyright to survive
cannot possibly be lost, and it is something that Stall-
man and many copyleft advocates have trouble answer-
ing, even though the websites belonging to the free
software advocates are filled with essays that criticise
copyright and intellectual property.31 Regardless of
these problems, the restrictions imposed by copyleft
have a good number of outspoken defenders set on
furthering the copyleft model in spite of any opposi-
tion.32
Validity of the GPL Licence
The viral nature of copyleft licences has generated a
considerable amount of interest in circles that transcend
software development. The idea of sharing materials is
not new, and has been made more evident by the cha-
otic and sometimes anarchic nature of the internet.33
However, shared materials tend to suffer from the possi-
bility of third parties that use the freely acquired infor-
mation to turn them into proprietary works. That is why
many different organisations are turning to the copyleft
model to protect works that are being freely shared
online. One such project is the OpenContent Licence
(‘‘OPL’’), a collaborative effort that sets a similar
licence to the GPL, ensuring that shared works will
continue to remain free to subsequent users.34 A more
ambitious project is Creative Commons, which offers a
wide range of licences applicable to all sorts of creative
material.35 In the area of biotechnology, there have been
some suggestions that the copyleft model could be used
to protect the public results of the human genome race
that are being placed in the public domain by research-
ers, something that has been suggested by a leading
member of the Human Genome Consortium, although
the idea has never been implemented.36
Despite the growing popularity of such licences, the
actual validity of the licences—and in particular of the
copyleft clauses—has yet to produce a court ruling dur-
ing its relatively short history. Until recently, there had
been no court cases against non-compliance with a
copyleft licence, and the few incidents that have arisen
had been dealt swiftly with cease-and-desist letters to
those parties suspected of producing proprietary soft-
ware.37
This all changed when a developer of non-proprietary
database software named MySQL sued NuSphere, a
software company that it believed was using its source
code to produce proprietary software—something that
contravened the terms of the GPL.38 This file was
issued in response to a suit filed by NuSphere claiming
‘‘breach of contract, tortious interference with third
party contracts and relationships and unfair competi-
tion’’.39 Unfortunately this case was settled out of court;
hence the GPL did not receive a judicial review in this
occasion. However, this was only the opening shot in
what is set to become one of the largest and most com-
plex legal battles that the software industry has ever
seen. The legal question about the validity of copyleft
licensing models broke spectacularly in legal circles in
March 2003 when the SCO Group—a well-known soft-
ware developer of UNIX-related products—filed a law-
suit against IBM alleging that the company was
30 M. J. Radin, ‘‘Humans, Computers, and Binding Commit-
ment’’ (2000) 75 Ind. L.J. 1125.
31 For example, see: Free Software Foundation, ‘‘Reevaluat-
ing Copyright: The Public Must Prevail’’, 1996, last updated
January 8, 2001, www.fsf.org/philosophy/reevaluating-
copyright.html.
32 For one such defender, see: E. Moglen, ‘‘Anarchism Tri-
umphant’’, First Monday, Vol.4 No.8, August 2, 1999, www.
firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html.
33 For more on this subject, see: A. Guadamuz, ‘‘The New
Sharing Ethic in Cyberspace’’ (2000) 5/1 Journal of World Intel-
lectual Property 129–139.
34 The licence can be found here: www.opencontent.org/
opl.shtml. Other interesting copyleft licences include the Design
Science License, the Open Audio Licence and even Open Cola,
the world’s first copyleft fizzy drink. See G. Lawton, ‘‘The Great
Giveaway’’, New Scientist, www.newscientist.com/hottopics/copyleft/
copyleftart.jsp.
35 http://creativecommons.org.
36 J. Sulston, ‘‘Intellectual Property and the Human Gen-
ome’’, Global Intellectual Property Rights (Drahos and Mayne ed.,
2002), pp.561–573.
37 G. Moody, Rebel Code (2001), p.313.
38 A FAQ about the case can be found here: www.mys.com/
news/article-75.html.
39 ibid.
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infringing its intellectual property over the UNIX ker-
nel.40 The full details of the suit are still sketchy because
SCO is keeping some of the most detailed information
of the code they allege to have been protecting as a close
secret, not letting it be known which part of the code it
claims ownership of.41 However, it is known that SCO
claims that back in 1985 AT&T and IBM signed a
contract to produce a version of UNIX called AIX. In
1995, SCO purchased all of the intellectual property
related to UNIX from AT&T, hence the claim they have
filed against IBM. It would seem that SCO is somehow
making claims that they own part of the code for AIX,
or that they own some other part of the UNIX kernel
code that is used in most machines running Linux dis-
tributions. Furthermore, SCO threatened to sue every
corporate Linux user for copyright infringement,42
claiming that any Linux user must purchase a licence
from them. This threat finally came to fruition in March
2004 when they sued DaimlerChrysler and auto parts
retailer AutoZone, two corporate Linux users.43 It is too
early to ascertain the strength of SCO’s arguments, but
it has become clear that this case has increased the
stakes in the financial importance of copyleft licences,
and hence the importance in making sure that the
licence terms are valid.44
It is also important to evaluate the validity of copyleft
licences from a European perspective, as most of the
existing literature in this subject come from the United
States.45 There are reasons to evaluate the validity of
copyleft licences from a European contract law per-
spective in at least two different fronts that vary from
the American approach: unfair contractual terms and
the rights of passing to a third party. Other legal aspects,
such as the competition law and the copyright aspect of
the protection of GPL works will be analysed as well, as
they vary in some aspects from the American
approaches.
Unfair contractual term
The first concern for the consideration of the validity of
the copyleft clauses must be to ask if they are unfair
according to European consumer protection legislation.
Most jurisdictions have different public policy restric-
tions to contractual terms, the most common being
restrictions against terms that will give away basic
human rights,46 but beyond these basically recognised
principles the range of restricted or excluded terms var-
ies from one jurisdiction to another.47 It is because of
the wide variation in this area of contract law that the
European Union felt the need to harmonise the differ-
ent approaches to unfair terms across Member States.
Consumers in the EU are now subject to a wide-ranging
regime designed to protect them from unfair terms in a
variety of circumstances in which they are presented
with pre-formulated standard contracts, a regime
implemented in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Con-
tracts Directive (‘‘the Directive’’),48 which specifies
what an unfair contractual term is, and sets a number of
considerations by which clauses will be analysed to test
for unfairness. The Directive also provides a non-
exhaustive list of some terms that will be considered
unfair, none of which applies directly to copyleft
licences.
The GPL contains several different clauses that may
be considered in light of the existing unfair terms legis-
lation. The most likely candidate for this is the limita-
tion of liability expressed in ss.11 and 12 of the licence.
Even though these are the sections most likely to be
found unfair, they will not be analysed in this article as
they are similar to any other limitation of liability, and
likely to receive the same analysis as those.49
The main question then is to analyse whether or not
the copyleft clause included in the GPL is unfair or not.
There are many issues to consider when asking this
question. The first one is whether the licensee of GPL-
protected software should be considered a consumer as
understood by the definition provided by Art.2(b) of
the Directive, which states that a consumer will be any
natural person who ‘‘is acting for purposes which are
outside his trade, business or profession’’. This is a very
broad definition of consumer, and even though the
wording of the Directive would seem to exclude legal
persons, it must be underlined that courts have gen-
erally taken a very broad interpretation as to what a
consumer is, even to include companies.50 The com-
mon interpretation of this requirement will be that the
person entering into a standard contract—such as a
software licence—will be considered to be a consumer if
they are not signing the contract in the regular course of
dealing in that business. It would be fair to assume that
if a software firm develops a software program and
licenses it to another software firm using the GPL, the
licensee firm will probably not be considered a con-
sumer for the purposes of the Directive. On the other
40 P. Galli, ‘‘SCO Group Slaps IBM With $1B Suit Over
Unix’’, E-Week, March 10, 2003, www.eweek.com/article2/
0,3959,922913,00.asp.
41 J. Harvey and T. McClelland, ‘‘SCO v. IBM: The Open
Source benefits and Risks are Real’’ (2003) 20/9 Computer &
Internet Lawyer 1.
42 P. Galli, ‘‘SCO Warns Linux Users of Legal Liability’’,
E-Week, May 14, 2003, www.eweek.com/article2/
0,3959,1149623,00.asp.
43 T. Weiss, ‘‘SCO Sues Two Linux Users, Warns About Fur-
ther Action’’, Computerworld, March 8, 2004, www.computer
world.com/softwaretopics/os/story/0,10801,90868,00.html?f=x72.
44 The most recent developments in this case can be followed
here: www.groklaw.net.
45 See for example: D. Kennedy, ‘‘A Primer on Open Source
Licensing Legal Issues: Copyright, Copyleft and Copyfuture’’
(2001) 20 St Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 345.
46 Radin, n.30 above.
47 In the United Kingdom for example, the Unfair Contract
Term Act 1977 (‘‘UCTA’’) contains an exhaustive list of unfair
terms, which include exclusion, limitation and indemnity
clauses.
48 Council Directive of April 5, 1993 93/13 on unfair terms in
consumer contracts [1993] O.J. L95/29. The Directive has
already been implemented in the United Kingdom in the shape
of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999
(‘‘UTCCR’’).
49 For more on exclusion of liability terms, see R. G. Lawson,
Exclusion clauses and unfair contract terms (6th ed., 2000).
50 Most recently in the United Kingdom one can find exam-
ples of this in SAM Business Systems Ltd v Hedley & Co [2002]
EWHC 2733.There are several older examples of this, such as
R&B Customs Brokers Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd [1988] 1
W.L.R. 321; and even Cass. Civ. 1re, April 28, 1987. Most
notably for software purposes are St Albans City & District Coun-
cil v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All E.R. 481.
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hand, an individual consumer who has acquired some
copyleft-licensed software could possibly make a strong
case arguing that he is signing the licence as a con-
sumer. This is of course a general interpretation, and
the circumstances of each contract must be individually
determined on a case-by-case basis.
Assuming that the licence is considered to be a con-
sumer contract as described, there is still a need to
determine whether the term itself is unfair. Article 3(1)
of the Directive specifies that:
‘‘A contractual term which has not been individually
negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the
requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbal-
ance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under
the contract, to the detriment of the consumer’’.
A term will be considered not to have been negotiated
individually if it has been drafted in advance and the
consumer did not have a say in the terms of the final
contract.51 This definition is at the heart of any con-
tractual dispute that may arise by the application of the
Directive, and its interpretation is the one that offers
more problems as it can be considered as using a very
open-ended requirement, such as the often nebulous
expression ‘‘good faith’’. In the United Kingdom, the
test for unfairness as expressed by the Directive has
been established by Director General of Fair Trading v
First National Bank Plc.52 According to this ruling, the
consumer must prove that there has been bad faith on
the part of the undertaking in the drafting of the con-
tract, that there is a significant imbalance in the obliga-
tions and powers of the parties, and that such imbalance
must be detrimental to the consumer. The court in this
ruling specified that good faith would be present if the
contract was signed with fair and open dealing. Open-
ness means that the term must be clear, legible and not
contain hidden pitfalls; and fair dealing would have to
be understood as that the supplier should not take
advantage of the other party’s relatively weak position.
It is important to note as well that some commentators
suggest that the concept of ‘‘good faith’’ should be
understood in accordance to civil law principles,53 and
as such many different aspects must be taken into con-
sideration, for example the gravity of the imbalance, the
social position of the parties and the way in which the
term in question came into existence.54
Analysing the copyleft clause with the requirements
presented by this ruling, one could say that there
appears to be an imbalance in the obligations of the
parties as the licensee will have to use the GPL and
cannot profit from derivative works. This imbalance
could also be assumed to be detrimental to the con-
sumer as it is imposing the responsibility of not being
able to use the work in whatever way it is desired. How-
ever, one must say that this is precisely the same type of
imbalance that exists in every other copyright-based
software licences, and hence it would be difficult to find
it unfair.
The main question will be in trying to determine if
there has been good faith by the drafter of the licence.
This is more difficult to ascertain given the test of good
faith presented above. In the case of the GPL, the test
does not appear to be met. The copyleft clause is clear
enough, does not contain hidden pitfalls, and the soft-
ware owner is not taking advantage of the relatively
weak position either because the consumer is always
free not to use the software if he so desires, and is even
free to look for similar software that does not use copy-
left licences. 
Based on this brief analysis of the copyleft contract
term and the existing European unfair contract legisla-
tion, it would seem that the GPL copyleft clause is
valid, as there are too many uncertainties as to whether
or not a court would interpret this clause in favour of a
licensee on the basis of the existence of good faith. It
must also be assumed that the copyleft clause will be
valid as it does not fall into any of the specified unfair
terms provided in the Annex to the Directive. However,
the question must remain open until the first case test-
ing the validity of this type of licence comes up. Given
the amount of money involved in software develop-
ment, it is likely that at some point copyleft will indeed
receive some judicial review.
Passing obligations and rights to third parties
Another interesting legal issue that arises when con-
sidering the validity of GPL clauses is the problem of
passing obligations to third parties. The legality of this
practice is usually covered under the English contract
law concept of the privity of contracts, of which there
are two rules, one for passing burdens and one for pass-
ing benefits.
The first rule exists under traditional privity doctrine,
where ‘‘a third party cannot be subjected to a burden by
a contract to which he is not a party’’.55 This general
principle is still in effect in most jurisdictions and
responds to the reasonable principle of legal security by
not allowing parties to place contractual burdens that
they are not aware of. Wherever this practice is per-
mitted, it is usually well regulated.56 The question must
be asked of whether the GPL constitutes the imposition
of a burden to third parties. The initial response would
be negative, as the imposition of the clause is done on a
one-to-one basis. If one does not agree with the copyleft
clause, then it is only logical that one should not use the
software; and certainly one should not use it to create a
derivative product.
If the passing of obligations is generally not accepted
in contract law, what happens to the passing of benefits?
There is a second controversial privity rule in English
law which does not allow a third party to benefit from
the contract, although the rule has been largely mod-
ified in England as to render it practically inexistent.57 It51 Directive 93/13, Art.3(2).
52 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc
[2001] UKHL 52; [2002] 1 A.C. 481.
53 E. McKendrick, Contract Law (4th ed., 2000), p.369.
54 Some of these principles in civil law can be seen in several
continental cases, such as Saladin/HBU, Hoge Raad, NJ 1967
261 (G. J. Scholten). For a more complete work on the subject
of good faith in civillLaw, see Good faith in European contract law,
(R. Zimmermann and S. Whittaker ed., 2000).
55 McKendrick, n.53 above, at p.133.
56 Radin notes for example where passing burdens are
accepted in competition law and in public policy issues, see:
Radin, n.30 above, at p.135.
57 This was done by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties)
Act 1999.
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is important to point out that this second privity rule
exists in civil law jurisdictions,58 where third-party
rights (known in Scotland as jus quaesitum tertio), have
been an integral part of contract law.59
The relevance of third-party rights to copyleft results
in the question of whether the originator of a program
licensed under the GPL may sue a licensee who is
located further down the software distribution chain for
breach of contract. Assuming that A is the software
creator and B is the copyleft licensee and B licenses the
software to C using the GPL; could A sue C for con-
tractual breach if C does not comply with the copyleft
clause? Contractually speaking, one would have to
assume that for A to successfully sue C; A must have a
third-party right arising from the contract between B
and C, which appears to be an invalid proposition.
The possible applicability of third-party rights to
copyleft can be better understood in the famous Scot-
tish case of Beta Computers v Adobe Systems.60 In this
case, Beta Computers provided a copy of software
authored by a third party called Informix, for which
they had a licence. The court in this case found that
Informix—although not part of the contract between
Adobe and Beta—had a third-party right. This position
has been adequately criticised by MacQueen, who says
that when the subject of a software transaction is a
licensing agreement, third-party rights cannot possibly
apply as a licence grants rights by the third party, it does
not create rights to the third party, which is the doctrinal
requirement of third-party rights.61 There cannot be
much doubt that in the case of copyleft licences, the
author’s rights arise from the licence itself and the con-
tractual provisions contained within. It will be seen later
whether the author could sue under copyright, provid-
ing the code has been copied without a licence, but it
would be more difficult to state that the author could
sue for a broken contractual term contained in the
licence. The contractual validity of the copyleft clause
would then work on a one-to-one basis, where only the
two parties involved could sue each other and there
would be no possibility of involving third parties, even if
the third party is the author.
Copyright infringement
The analysis above would seem to indicate that the
author or owner of a work that has been licensed using
copyleft will find it difficult to sue subsequent users of
the software down a distribution chain for contract
breach. Yet the question still remains whether the
author can sue for copyright infringement. The answer
to this is much more straightforward than the contrac-
tual analysis.
Using the same example cited above, let us assume
that A is the software owner and B is the copyleft licen-
see, and that B licenses the software to C using the
GPL. C modifies the software and releases a proprietary
version of it by closing the source code to subsequent
users. Could A sue C for copyright infringement? The
answer is a definitive yes, as copyright is less preoccu-
pied with who licensed the software to C, but the
emphasis would be whether or not C is committing
actions that would be considered as infringing A’s copy-
right. The question then would become one of infringe-
ment and originality, possibly hinging on the question
of whether or not C has done enough work to the origi-
nal source code to be considered an original work.
This is a much better explored area of copyright law.
Computer software is awarded copyright protection as a
literary work if it is considered to be an original work.62
The question of originality has been long discussed by
the courts, but there is agreement that an original work
is one that demonstrates the use of skill and labour by
the author, in short, that ‘‘that it should originate from
the author’’.63 Even though the originality requirement
states that the work should not be copied in its entirety,
courts have recognised that a certain amount of copying
is acceptable. For example, copying of the drawing of
existing designs has been deemed to be original in some
instances.64 When copying exists, the copying must ful-
fil the long-standing qualitative test to determine
whether the copying has been substantial.65
In computer software, the courts have been following
the general qualitative test in cases of copying from
another work. In both Richardson Computers v Flanders66
and Ibcos v Barclays,67 the courts found that if there had
been any copying from a protected original work, there
had to be an analysis of whether such copying had been
substantial. It is important to stress that the test is for
qualitative copying, not quantitative. There will be
some consideration about the quantity of the work cop-
ied,68 but even if this is minimal it may result that the
copying may be deemed to be substantial. This is evi-
dent in the case of Cantor v Tradition,69 where copying
of original source code took place by former employees
of a financial services company. In this case, expert
witnesses found that only 2 per cent of the original
source code had been copied, accounting for only 2,952
58 And in mixed legal systems such as Scotland.
59 In France, for example, privity of contract is qualified by
Art.1121 of the Code Civil, which allows third-party rights. In
Germany, Art.328 of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch allows for the
performance of rights by third parties. Another example can be
found in Art.2.115 of the Principles of European Contract Law;
see European Commission on Contract Law, Principles of Euro-
pean Contract Law: Part 1: Performance, Non-performance, Reme-
dies (O. Lando and H. Beale ed., 1995).
60 1996 S.C.L.R. 587.
61 For an excellent attack to this ruling, see: H. L. MacQueen,
‘‘Software Transactions and Contract Law’’, Law and the Inter-
net: Regulating Cyberspace (Edwards and Waelde ed., 1997).
62 s.3(1)(b) UK CDPA 1988.
63 University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd
[1916] 2 Ch. 601.
64 For examples of this see The Duriron Co Inc v Hugh Jennings
& Co Ltd [1984] F.S.R. 1; and Interlego v Tyco Industries [1989]
A.C. 217; [1988] 3 All E.R. 949.
65 Existing in common law since Bleistein v Donaldson Lithog-
raphy Co 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
66 John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders and Chemtec Ltd
[1993] F.S.R. 497.
67 Ibcos Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance
[1994] F.S.R. 275.
68 For which software may be helpful in analysing the number
of lines of code copied, for instance software such as MOSS:
www.cs.berkeley.edu/%7Eaiken/moss.html.
69 Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd [1999]
Masons C.L.R. 157.
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lines of code out 77,000.70 The lines of code were
deemed to be of importance for some modules in the
resulting software, but the copying was not considered
substantial enough to grant the infringement case, but
was enough for the copier to agree to take financial
responsibility for the infringed code and offer to pay for
it. Nevertheless, the fact that some of the copying was
even considered in the ruling must send signals to
potential copiers of non-proprietary software about
their chances in court.
Given the state of the rulings in software copyright
infringement, it appears that if a copyright author or
owner can prove to a court that a proprietary copy of
their original software has been infringed, then it will
not matter just how they obtained the software, and it
will certainly not matter if they are further down in a
chain of distribution. If a programmer uses substantial
sections of code belonging to a copyleft program, that
programmer will still be subject to legal action by the
author. There may also be a question about moral
rights, but these considerations fall outside of the scope
of the present article.71
On a side note regarding enforcement of copyright, it
is interesting to point out that the FSF recommends to
all those programmers using the GPL that they should
assign copyright ownership of their works to the FSF
because in that way they can enforce the licence better
in case of infringement.72
Competition law
There is one final area that may provide validity prob-
lems for copyleft licences. Even though these licences
do not impose obligations to third parties as the licence
is passed to a single licensee at the time, it is less clear
whether such restrictions could be considered anti-
competitive in accordance to European competition
rules, as it could be found that the imposition of the
copyleft clause, even if done on a one-to-one basis,
could be found to be anti-competitive.
EC competition rules have a set of provisions that
impose certain restrictions on the passing of obligations
through a distribution chain which may create anti-
competitive restrictions on the recipient; this is evident
in the regulation and implementation of competition
law in the area of licensing and vertical agreements.
Vertical agreements in the competition sense ‘‘are those
entered into between undertakings whose relationship
is complementary, such as manufacturer and distrib-
utor or licensor and licensee’’.73 An example of a regu-
lated vertical agreement is the existing set of restrictions
in the area of technology transfer licensing, where a
number of impositions down a distribution chain are
blacklisted.74
There is an ongoing debate about the seriousness of
vertical agreements that impose restrictions through a
distribution chain, as economists in the 1980s started
seeing vertical restraints in a positive light75 despite
some early emphasis by the European courts on clamp-
ing down on these types of agreements.76 The debate
has continued, with the official position steadily moving
towards a less restrictive approach towards vertical
restrictions. In fact, a Green Paper by the European
Commission found that
‘‘distribution agreements raise special difficulties because
they are usually something of a two-edged sword. They
can be a useful way for a firm to penetrate a new market
and to sell its products effectively. But they can also be
used to prevent outsiders from entering a market, and so
perpetuate the compartmentalization of the Commu-
nity’’.77
National implementation of the European rules seems
to vary as well. It has been generally commented that
the United Kingdom has a less strict application of
vertical restrictions than the rest of Europe, with the
emphasis being placed on whether there will be a sanc-
tion for such practices being placed on undertakings
with considerable market dominance that is used in
detriment to the consumer.78 Having said this, licensors
of copyleft software are not likely to posses the market
share to be considered dominant by any stretch of the
imagination. It is also very unlikely that these licences
would be considered to impose a considerable damage
on the consumer, as they always have the option to
purchase non-copyleft software. Another important
consideration is that copyleft licences do not fall into
the four main types of vertical agreements listed by the
European Commission in their Green Paper (exclusive
distribution, exclusive purchasing, selective distribution
and franchising).79
In this light, it seems unlikely that copyleft licences
will be considered anti-competitive by the courts and
regulators, but this is an area that demands more
scrutiny.
Conclusion
An initial look at the problem of the validity of copyleft
licences (particularly the GPL), seems to provide a pos-
itive response to this novel and ingenious software dis-
tribution model. There are some unanswered questions,
in particular with regards to privity of contracts, but as
long as the contractual chain is kept at the most simple
relationship between licensor and licensee, the validity
of the copyleft clause appears to be sound. Software
authors interested in making sure that their works are
distributed to the largest number of people without fear
70 I. Lloyd, Information Technology Law (3rd ed., 2000),
p.411.
71 For an excellent look at moral rights and OSS, see A. Metz-
ger and T. Jaeger, ‘‘Open Source Software and German Copy-
right Law’’ (2001) 32 I.I.C. 52–74.
72 E. Moglen, ‘‘Why the FSF gets copyright assignments from
contributors’’, www.gnu.org/copyleft/why-assign.html.
73 D. G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (3rd ed., 1998), p.13.
74 See: Commission Regulation 240/96 on the application of
Art.85(3) of the EC Treaty to certain categories of technology
transfer agreements [1996] O.J. L31/2. For more on vertical
restraints, see M. Furse, Competition Law of the UK & EC
(1999), pp.104–112.
75 Furse, ibid. at p.105.
76 See for example Consten and Grundig v Commission, Joined
Cases 56 and 58/64 [1996] E.C.R. 299; C.M.L.R. 418.
77 European Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in
EC Competition Policy, COM (96) 721, http://europa.eu.int/en/
record/green/gp9701/vrtocen.htm.
78 Furse, n.74 above, at p.105.
79 European Commission, n.77 above.
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of commercial interests placing a fence over their works
should definitely consider the copyleft model as a suc-
cessful example, but some reservations may still be
healthy until copyleft licences are finally tested in court.
Authors may also be willing to consider other types of
licences because the GPL, although apparently valid,
suffers from drafting errors and too many revisions. In
this respect, a good look at licences offered by other
suppliers, such as the Creative Commons project, may
be advisable.
Something else that would be welcome is to see more
European versions of copyleft licences. Although this
article has concluded that the GPL seems to be valid in
accordance to UK law, country-specific licences will
have less problem in being considered valid in different
jurisdictions.
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